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Jackson: A Proposal for Declaratory Judgment Procedure

A PROPOSAL FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMNT
PROCEDURE'
THoAAs

B.

JAcKsONO

'

The subject matter of this address has not been before this
association for many years and so far as the record discloses nothing
effective concerning it has ever been accomplished. It relates solely
to procedure and for the benefit of those who persistently cling to
the archaic, those who are temperamentally opposed to change, those
who oppose anything resembling an innovation, and those who worship common-law procedure, let me say that what I propose in no
way changes our existing procedure but simply adds to it, and
makes available to the practitioner of today, a remedy now available under federal law and the laws of most of the states. I
refer to declaratory judgment procedure. Much has been written
on this subject within the last two decades and hundreds of cases
have been decided in that space of time. Within the scope of this
paper, nothing more can be done than briefly to consider the nature
of the procedure, the history of the movement and its present
status in this country, some of the decisions, the adaptability of
such procedure to our system of pleading and practice and its usefulness therein. In speaking on this subject I do so with some
diffidence in the presence of our distinguished guest and honorary
member, Professor Edson R. Sunderland of the Law School of the
University of Michigan, who, as all of you know, is an outstanding
authority on procedure of all kinds. I do not make any claim to
originality or erudition in presenting this matter to you but do so
in the hope that after proper study the remedy which is advocated
may be adopted by the courts of this state.
NATURE OF THE PROCEDURE

The essential purpose of the declaratory judgment is, as stated
in the Uniform Act,' "to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." It
may perhaps be best defined by pointing out those characteristics
which distinguish it from ordinary judgments as we know them,
which is aptly done by Borchard in his statement,
* Address of the President of the West Virginia Bar Association, delivered
at the fifty-fourth annual meeting of that Association at White Sulphur
Springs, West Virginia, on August 18, 1938.
" President of the West Virginia Bar Association 1937-38; member of the
Charleston bar and of the Judicial Council of West Virginia.
'9 U. L. A. (1932) 121, § 1.
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...... that in form it differs in no essential respect from
any other action, except that the prayer for relief does not
seek execution or performance from the defendant or opposing
party. It seeks only a final determination, adjudication,
ruling, or judgment from the court, but the conditions of the
usual action, procedural and substantive, must always be
present, namely, the competence or jurisdiction of the court
over parties and subject-matter, the capacity of the parties to
sue and be sued, the adoption of the usual forms for conducting judicial proceedings (including process, pleadings, and
evidence), the existence of operative facts justifying the
judicial declaration of the legal consequences, the assertion
against an interested party of rights capable of judicial protection, and a sufficient legal interest in the moving party to
entitle him to invoke a judgment in his behalf .... "'

The question naturally comes to mind as to what operative
facts are necessary for a judgment. Such facts are those essential
to an ordinary judgment, or those upon which no relief may be had
other than by a declaration of rights, status, or legal relationship.
The first class is familiar enough and the second also may be
illustrated by such instances as where a claim of relationship is
made by one person and denied by another, claims of exemption
from tax liability or the requirement of a license, or liability to
perform a contract at some future time.
The same author enumerates the principal functions of a
declaratory judgment as being:
(1) to afford a speedy and inexpensive method of
". ...
adjudicating legal disputes; (2) to narrow the issues and, by so
doing, to dispose of disputes in their initial stages, before they
have become full-grown battles with their accumulation of bitterness and impaired relations; (3) to make it unnecessary to
destroy the status quo as a condition of bringing a contested
issue or adverse claims to litigation, thus enabling written instruments, including contracts and statutes, to be construed
without the necessity for prior breach, thereby preventing
future litigation; (4) to make it unnecessary for a plaintiff to
act upon his own interpretation of his rights and at his peril
as a condition of judicial action, or to forbear from a contemplated but challenged step for fear of incurring loss, thus
avoiding the dangerous necessity for leaps in the dark or the
alternative timorous surrender of legitimate claims; (5) to
remove uncertainty and insecurity from legal relations, and
thus to clarify, quiet, and stabilize them before irretrievable
acts have been undertaken; (6) to enable an issue of ques21BoRcHARD, DECLARATORY JuDGmENTs (1934) 23.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol45/iss1/5

2

Jackson: A Proposal for Declaratory Judgment Procedure
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
tioned status or fact on which a whole complex of rights may
depend, to be expeditiously determined; (7) to enable interdependent rights involving numerous parties to be settled in
a single proceeding; (8) to enable trustees, executors, receivers, and others acting in a fiduciary capacity to obtain
authoritative guidance and protection against liability in the
administration of their trusts. . .. "3
The enumeration which I have just given might seem to include all possible functions but such is not the case for the authority quoted continues his enumeration of certain other functions, viz:
". ... (9) to enable a creditor or claimant whose interests
are jeopardized by attack, challenge, act or new event, to establish his claim, and by vindicating his right to prevent future injury or disadvantage; (10) to enable a debtor or person charged
with duty, liability, disability, danger, risk, or forfeiture, to
disavow the burden, charge, or risk, and thus remove the cloud
on his rights; (11) to enable an obligor or contractor who
maintains that time or circumstance has entitled him to release from his obligation, to sue the obligee for a declaration
of release, complete or partial, or for a declaration of satisfactory performance; (12) to enable a person claiming his
own privilege or immunity or his adversary's duty or liability
to secure a judicial recognition of these claims, without proceeding to enforcement or execution, an opportunity as helpful to the pacification of legal relations in the private as in the
public sphere; (13) to enable public duties and powers to be
established without the cumbersome and technical prerequisites of mandamus, certiorari, injunction, prohibition, or
habeas corpus; (14) to enable a claimant to choose a mild but
adequate form of relief by declaration in place of drastic and
harsh coercion which he does not desire or need."
A report to the United States Senate by Senator King in 1934
describes the declaratory judgment as follows:
"Th 9 declaratory judgment differs in no essential respect
from any other judgment except that it is not followed by a decree for damages, injunction, specific performance, or other immediately coercive decree. It declares conclusively and finally
the rights of parties in litigation over a contested issue, a form
of relief which often suffices to settle controversies and fully
administer justice. It enables parties in disputes over their
rights over a contract, deed, lease, will, or any other written instrument to sue for a declaration of rights, without breach of
the contract, etc., citing as defendants those who oppose their
claims of right. It has been employed in State courts mainly
3 BonciARD,DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 94,
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for the construction of instruments of all kinds, for the determination of status in marital or domestic relations, for the
determination of contested rights of property, real or personal,
and for the declaration of rights contested under a statute or
municipal ordinance, where it was not possible or necessary to
obtain an injunction."

While a declaratory judgment may only be obtained through
a certain type of procedure it does not in any way affect substantive
rights. This fact was early emphasized in the leading English case
of Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. Hannaj & Company;'
wherein the court distinguished between jurisdiction and procedure
in construing Order XXV, rule 5, of the Supreme Court of
Judicature, of which it was said:
But if its only effect is to provide that the Court
may deal with a matter with which it can already deal in a
different manner under different circumstances and when
brought before it by a different person, it is, in my opinion,
'
only dealing with practice and procedure and is intra vires."
The order in question reads as follows:
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on
the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is
sought thereby, and the Court may make binding declarations
of right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed
or not. "0
The decisions of the American state courts have in general
recognized the procedural nature of the remedy and in the recent
case of Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth,7 the United
States Supreme Court held that ". . . . the operation of the
Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only", and that Congress
was acting within its constitutional powers in providing for the
federal procedure.
HISTORY AND STATUS

In 1922 at the meeting of this association in Huntington, Mr.
J. W. Madden, then Dean of the College of Law of West Virginia
University, at the request of our Executive Council, read a paper
on Declaratory Judgments.8 At that time only nine states had
4 (1915) 2 K. B. 536.
Id. at 563.
BR. S. C., 0. XXV, r. 5.
7300 U. S. 227, 57 S. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617 (1937).
8 Madden, Declaratory Judgments (1922) REP. W. VA. BAR Ass IN 231.
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declaratory judgment acts in force, disregarding rather ineffective
prior legislation in Rhode Island and New Jersey. Michigan was
the pioneer in 1919, followed by California, Connecticut, Florida,
Kansas, Kentucky, New York, South Carolina, and Virginia; the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was far removed from passage
by Congress; the American Bar Association had scarcely begun to
advocate the declaratory judgment; and the uniform declaratory
judgments act had not been adopted in any of the states, having
only been approved in the year 1922 by the commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Committee on Noteworthy Changes in the
Statute Law of the American Bar Association in its report in 1919
stated that "No more important statutes dealing with the administration of justice have been passed in recent years than those
authorizing the courts to enter declaratory judgments determining
rights and duties." There was comparatively little case law on the
subject and the bar of the country was generally unfamiliar with
such procedure. Since that meeting of this association the uniform
act has been adopted in twenty-four states; a number of others have
acts of their own; and in addition the federal act has now been in
force for four years.
That the declaratory judgment is a comparatively modern
idea in the United States is illustrated by the fact that the first
article on the subject was written by Professor Sunderland in 1917
and it was only in 1919 that the Michigan act went into effect.
However, this form of judgment dates back in England to the year
1852, although in restricted form, by reason of judicial construction, until 1883 when Order XXV, rule 5, was adopted, since
which time it has come into wide use. It was known in Scotland
for several centuries prior to its introduction into England, and
existed for a time in the Roman Law and thereafter became established in other systems of jurisprudence before introduction into
the English system. There was no discussion of Mr. Madden's
address at the time it was delivered and while the senthent of the
association at the time cannot be ascertained, it appears that the
procedure which was suggested later met with favor for we find
9
that thereafter this association made an unsuccessful effort in 1931,
to secure the enactment of a declaratory judgment law. The report
of the Legislative Committee for the year named, referring to the
proposed law, states that "Such an act seems to be in line with
9 (1931) REP. W. VA. BAR Ass'x.T 79-80.
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modern methods of legal administration. The Committee recommends that further study be given to such an act, and that the Committee be authorized to further its passage, if deemed advisable after
further study." At that time an article by Professor Borchard appeared, 10 and doubtless influenced the committee in its effort to secure the procedure and its recommendation to the association.
Thereafter the matter does not appear to have been pursued further.
Order XXV, rule 5, is the basis of declaratory judgment procedure as known in modern times in English speaking countries, as
construed and applied in 1911 in Dyson v. Attorney Generat,1" and
in 1915 in the Guaranty Trzist case. 2 It served to put into effect a
procedure much wider in its application than was known under
pre-existing practice in England. This order together with order
LIV A has been adopted substantially, or without change at all, in
Canada and many other jurisdictions of the British Empire. Practically all of the American declaratory judgment acts in use are
based on the earlier order. Section 1 of the Uniform Act is based
on this order, while Section 2 is based on the later order, which
reads as follows:
"In any Division of the High Court, any person claiming
to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument,
may apply by originating summons for the determination of
any question of construction arising under the instrument,13and
for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested.'
The later order did not enlarge substantially the scope of the
earlier one, but simply went into greater particularity and appears
to have been promulgated to stimulate the latent powers of the
court not in general use. It appears from the Guaranty case that
the first order did not really enlarge the existing jurisdiction of th(courts and it too was evidently promulgated to encourage the use
of declaratory judgments, in much the same manner that statutes
conferring rule making powers on the courts, do not, according to
the view of some authorities, give the courts any powers not inherent in them, but simply encourage the exercise of such powers.
In that case, Banks, L. J., stated:
10 Borchard, The Declaratory Jvdgment in the United States (1931) 37 W.
VA. L. Q 127.
11 (1912) 1 Ch. 158.
12 (1915) 2 X. B. 536.
"s R. S. C., 0. LIV A, r. 1.
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"I cannot doubt that had the Court of Chancery of those
days [before 1852] thought it expedient to make mere
declaratory judgments they would have claimed and exercised
the right to do so. It was amongst other things to amend the
practice and procedure of the Court of Chancery in this respect that s. 50 of the Act of 1852 was14passed. The preamble
of the statute makes this point clear."1
The statutes of New York and Connecticut may be regarded
as typical of those statutes based on Order XXV, rule 5, and in
those states rules of court supplement the statute. The Uniform
Act is in much greater detail than those acts based on the English
orders, which is evidently due to the fact that it is designed for
those states where the courts lack the rule making power whereby
the statute can be supplemented with rules as in the case of the two
states referred to. The first and second sections of the act read as
follows:
"Sec. 1. Courts of record within their respective jurisdiction shall have power to declare rights, status, and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection
on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed
for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in
form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree.
"Sec. 2. Any person interested under a deed, will, written
contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute,
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder." 16
The remaining sections of the act provide that a contract may
be construed either before or after a breach; make provision for
suits by persons in a representative capacity in respect of matters
affecting them in such capacity; provide that the enumeration of
specific powers shall not restrict the exercise of the general powers
conferred in section 1; that the court may refuse a declaration
where it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving
14 Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Hannay & Co., (1915) 2 K. B. 536, 568
(Italics supplied.)
t 9 U. L. A. (1932) 121.
16 Id. at 123.
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rise to the proceeding; that all orders, judgments and decrees may
be reviewed as in other cases; that supplemental relief based on a
declaratory judgment may be granted whenever necessary or
proper; that issues of fact may be determined as in other civil
cases; for awarding costs; that all persons shall be made parties
who have or claim any interest affected by the declaration; and
that no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties; that municipalities shall be represented in proceedings affecting the validity of an ordinance or franchise; and that the state
shall be represented in proceedings affecting the constitutionality
of an ordinance, franchise or statute; that the act shall be construed
as remedial; define certain words used in the act; provide that the
provisions of the act, excepting sections 1 and 2, shall be severable;
that there shall be uniformity of interpretation; and eoitain other
incidental provisions.
The federal act of June 14, 1934, marked the culmination of
years of effort on the part of the American Bar Association and
other interested parties to secure such legislation. A Senate subcommittee as early as 1928 held a hearing on the proposed federal
act at which appeared a number of interested persons as witnesses,
including Mr. Henry W. Taft, representing the American Bar Association, Professor Edward M. Borchard, of the Yale Law School,
an authority on declaratory judgments, and Professor Sunderland.
The bill then pending had, at the time, been passed by the House
of Representatives in four separate Congresses, was endorsed by
the gentlemen named, and was reported by the sub-committee, but
in spite of this it was not until some six years later that the federal
statutes finally provided for a declaratory judgment. This act
reads as follows:
"(1)
In cases of actual controversy except with respect
to Federal taxes the courts of the United States shall have
power upon petition, declaration, complaint, or other appropriate pleadings to declare rights and other legal relations of
any interested party petitioning for such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be prayed, and such declaration
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and
be reviewable as such.
"(2)
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment,
or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The
application shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction
to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party,
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whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaration, to show
cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
"(3)
When a declaration of right or the granting of
further relief based thereon shall involve the determination of
issues of fact triable by a jury, such issues may be submitted
to a jury in the form of interrogatories, with proper instructions by the court, whether a general verdict be required or
not. "',7
The first section is quite similar to section 1 of the Uniform
Act; the second section is practically identical with section 8 thereof; and the third section contains substantially the same provisions
as section 9 of the same act. No necessity for greater detail in the
act appears to have existed, as it made no material change in the
then existing procedure, except to permit a declaration rather than
the usual form of judgment or decree. The distinguishing feature
of the federal act, as compared with most of the state acts, is that
it expressly excepts controversies with respect to federal taxes.
The policy of restricting the benefits to be obtained by a declaratory judgment and of depriving the taxpayer of an opportunity to contest a tax without running the risk of incurring what
in most cases are severe penalties, or in the alternative, of putting
him upon the necessity of paying the tax and then proceeding to
seek to recover it is certainly open to criticism and has been often
condemned. Such a policy appears to be but a manifestation of the
spirit now prevalent in the executive and legislative branches of
our national government to take from the taxpayer all that is
possible and to leave to him, in the case of unlawful exaction of
taxes, a difficult or doubtful remedy, and in some instances no
remedy at all for recovering the tax.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES

As frequently happens when legislation of a novel type is enacted, and particularly when such legislation provides for procedural reform, with which lawyers are more or less unfamiliar,
an assault is promptly made upon constitutional grounds, and such
was the case upon the introduction of the declaratory judgment.
The Michigan statute was promptly assailed in Anway v. Grand
8 In this
Rapids Railvay Company."
case a nonunion street railway employee brought suit against his employer for a declaration
STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. 0. A. § 400 (1938).
is211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920).
17 49
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of his right to work more than six days a week in the face of a
Michigan statute forbidding the employer to require him to work
a greater length of time. The street railway workers' union intervened against the asserted right of the plaintiff to work more than
six days a week, and was undoubtedly an adverse party, although
there was no controversy between the original parties. In deciding
the case the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the act was unconstitutional because it required the court to render an advisory
opinion or decide a moot case, which would involve the exercise of
a nonjudicial function, which was not within the power of the legislature to bestow upon the court. To the extent that there was no
real controversy between plaintiff and defendant, the opinion would
have been advisory, but apparently the court overlooked the fact
that there was a real controversy between the intervener union,
which had been made a party to the suit, on the one side, and
plaintiff and defendant on the other. The decision was by a divided
court and the error of the majority is clearly pointed out in the
minority dissent. The decision in this case became immediately the
source of severe criticism on all sides, and is referred to in Mr.
Madden's paper wherein he argues against the correctness of the
conclusion reached by the majority of the court. In the later case
of Washington-Detroit Theater Company v. Moorel9 the Michigan
court held that the Michigan statute, as amended subsequent to the
Anway case was constitutional since the amendment provided that
the act should apply only to cases of actual controversy and that
declarations should have the effect of final judgments. By basing
its decision largely on these amendments, the Michigan court found
a way out of the unfortunate effect of the decision in the Anway
case although it is generally maintained that the original Michigan
act contained impliedly the conditions which were later expressly
attached to it. In regard to declaratory judgments applying only
to cases of actual controversy the comment of Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in the Aetna case that "The word 'actual' is one of emphasis rather than of definition ' 20 is interesting, even though it is now
universally conceded that declaratory judgments can only be
rendered in cases involving actual controversies. For a time - and
perhaps it still exists among those not familiar with the procedure
there was a belief that declaratory judgments involved the
19 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930).
20 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240, 57 S. Ct. 461, 81 L.
Ed. 617 (1937).
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rendering of advisory opinions. The distinction as to an advisory
opinion is stated by Mr. Justice Sharp in the dissent in the Anway
case in the following language:
"Herein lies the distinction between declaratory judgments
and moot cases or advisory opinions. The declaratory judgment
is a final one, forever binding on the parties on the issues
presented; the decision of a moot case is mere dictum as no
rights are affected thereby, while an advisory opinion is but
an expression of the law as applied to certain facts not
necessarily in dispute and can have no binding effect on any
future litigation between interested persons.'
The distinction is further made as follows:
Strictly speaking, the rendering of advisory
opinions is not a judicial function at all, but that of an attorney-general or law officer. It is vested by many jurisdictions
in their highest court, because there is no constitutional bar,
and the court could not decline. But the opinion binds no
one, not even the judges, is not rendered between parties, is
given to the asking official or department, and is often rendered
without hearing argument. In all these respects, it differs

from the declaratory judgment.'

'22

Following the Anway case several states specifically provided
that the judgment should be rendered only "in cases of actual controversy" while Kansas and Virginia went so far as to specify cases
involving "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of rights".
The statutes in these states have been sustained as constitutional
while, in other states, statutes not containing any such specifications
have likewise been upheld. There is an excellent article by William
Gorham Rice, of the New York State Bar,2 3 apparently induced
by the decision in the Anway case, from which it appears that the
author's argument for constitutionality has been fully sustained
by the course of subsequent judicial decisions.
After the Ivichigan decision, Kansas was the next state where
the constitutionality of a declaratory judgment act was attacked.
The question was raised in State v. Grove.24 The defendant was an
employee of a railway company who had been elected to a municipal office. A state statute prohibited railway employees from hold21 Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 ifdch. 592, 635, 179 N. W. 350, 365
(1920).
22 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 52.
23 Rice, The ConstituticnZity of the DeclaratoryJudgment (1922) 28 W. VA.

L.24ca109
Q. 1

6
Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921).
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ing any elective municipal office in instances where the railroad
held a franchise from the municipality. Instead of waiting for
Grove to take office and then attempting to inflict criminal punishment upon him for violation of the statute, the attorney general
instituted proceedings for a declaration as to Grove's right to hold
office. The Kansas Supreme Court in ruling that he was ineligible
to take office sustained the constitutionality of the statute, differentiating the Kansas statute from the MAlichigan statute because
the former contained the phrase "cases of actual controversy" although the Kansas court actually disapproved the majority opinion
in the Anway case. Of course Grove might have been proceeded
against after taking office by quo warranto or injunction, or by
criminal prosecution, instead of by a proceeding whereby a declaration of right was obtained.
The Kansas case lead the way for other state decisions upholding the constitutionality of other declaratory judgment acts,
and thereafter the courts do not appear to have had much trouble
in deciding the question in favor of the act. For example in New
York, in an action for a declaration as to the amount of a tax levy
under the state constitution, it was held that "The constitutionality
is not open to question." '2 5 Following
of such a proceeding ....
the Grove case there was the decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in the case of Braman v. Babcock,28 involving a question of
fact as to whether the plaintiff was the devisee designated as
Braman" under a will. The Connecticut court took the
-position that it could decide the question of fact involved but declined to do so because the property was situate in Rhode Island.
The point was raised in this case that the rendering of a declaratory judgment involved the exercise of a nonjudicial function, to
which the court answered:
"Turning to the function or duty imposed by our Declaratory Judgment Act upon the Superior Court as set forth
above, could it be claimed with any pretense of reason, that
the function was legislative or executive? The answer is obvious. We must, then, conclude that the function is judicial, or
that it falls outside of the three functions described as legislative, executive, or judicial. It would be a travesty to hold
that this method of remedial justice could find no place in our
25 Board of Education v. Van Zandt, 119 lise. 124, 195 N. Y. Supp. 297
(1922), affId, 234 N. Y. 644, 138 N. E. 481 (1923).
20 98 Conn. 549, 120 AtI. 150 (1923).
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system of government unless a place was made for it by an
amendment to the Constitution.... ,,17
After the Braman case other decisions as to the constitutionality and nature of the judicial function exercised in rendering a
declaratory judgment followed in various states, including Virginia, where the supreme court ruled on the question in Patterson's
Executors v. Patterson,28 so that today in every state where the
validity of an act has been attacked, the courts have sustained the
legislation in question.
The decisions as to constitutionality have included the uniform act, the first case relating to which was the Tennessee case of
Miller v. M ller."9 In other states where the uniform act is in
force it has been held constitutional without exception whenever
the question has been raised.
In the test case under the uniform act in Wyoming, viz.,
Holly Sugar Corporation v. Fitzler,30 a declaration, negative in
character, was sought by plaintiff, which was engaged in a controversy with certain sugar beet growers, to the effect that plaintiff
was not violating its contract with the growers in paying a certain
price for beets or in operating its factory as it did. In holding
that it had the power to render a negative declaration, the court
held such a declaration to be entirely judicial in character, remarking that,
".... In 28 Yale L. J. 1 is contained an article which
has traced the history of these judgments, and from which it
appears that, though only to a limited extent, they were or
have been in use under the Roman, Italian, French and German laws, and continually in Scotland for several centuries,
and that our laws are based on those which were first introduced in England in 1852. When mankind has, accordingly,
considered proceedings of that character as judicial for the
period of 2,000 years, it would ill behoove us to declare the
contrary. 1'31
CONSTrUTIONALITY UNDE.

FED ERA

DEcIsIoNs

The first case to reach the Supreme Court of the United States
involving a state declaratory judgment act was Liberty Warehouse
27 Id. at 556, 120 AtI. at 152.
28 144 Va.113, 131 S. E.217 (1926).

29 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924).
:342 Wyo. 446, 296 Pac. 206 (1930).
31 Id. at 461, 296 Pac. at 209.
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Company v. Grannis.32 Prior to the federal case, the Kentucky
court had sustained the validity of an act of that state regulating
tobacco sales in warehouses. Thereafter plaintiffs, who were nonresident warehousemen, brought an action under the conformity
act for declaratory relief in the federal district court against the
prosecuting attorney alleging that he was about to indict them and
asserting that the warehouse act was unconstitutional and that they
were not subject to penalties for violation of its terms. The district
court was of the opinion that it could not exercise jurisdiction
under the conformity act and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed this decision on the ground that the conformity act could
not be used in a question involving "practice, pleading and forms
and modes of proceeding", and added the suggestion that the issue
presented no case or controversy under the terms of Article III,
Section 2, of the Federal Constitution. After the Liberty Warehouse case the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the Tennessee Uniform Act in Nashville, Chattanooga& St. Louis Railway
Company v. Wallace.3 A state excise tax levied upon the storage
of gasoline by plaintiff railway company, which used the gasoline
in interstate commerce, was attacked as being in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in an action in the state court under the
Tennessee act. The Supreme Court of Tennessee sustained the
act and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States, which held that a case or controversy within the power of
that court to review was presented under the declaratory judgment
procedure of Tennessee, the opinion saying:
"Thus the narrow question presented for determination
is whether the controversy before us, which would be justiciable in this Court if presented in a suit for injunction, is
any the less so because through a modified procedure appellant
has been permitted to present it in the state courts, without
praying for an injuction or alleging that3 irreparable injury
will result from the collection of the tax."
In holding that the case presented a controversy within the
meaning of the Federal Constitution, the Court said:
"The issues raised here are the same as those which under
old forms of procedure could be raised only in a suit for an injunction or one to recover the tax after its payment. But the
32273 U. S. 70, 47 S.Ot. 282, 71 L. Ed. 541 (1926).
33 288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730 (1933).
34 Id. at 262, 53 S. Ct. at 348, 77 L. Ed. at 735.
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Constitution does not require that the case or controversy
should be presented by traditional forms of procedure, invoking only traditional remedies. The judiciary clause of the
Constitution defined and limited judicial power, not the particular method by which that power might be invoked. It did
not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as
the only possible means for presenting a case or controversy
otherwise cognizable by the federal courts. Whenever the
judicial power is invoked to review a judgment of a state court,
the ultimate constitutional purpose is the protection, by the
exercise of the judicial function, of rights arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. The states are
left free to regulate their own judicial procedure. Hence,
changes merely in the form or method of procedure by which
federal rights are brought to final adjudication in the state
courts are not enough to preclude review of the adjudication
by this Court, so long as the case retains the essentials of an
adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy, which is finally determined by the judgment below.
* '* *As the prayer for relief by injunction is not a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power, allegations
of threatened irreparable injury which are material only if an
injunction is asked, may likewise be dispensed with if, in other
respects, the controversy presented is, as in this case, real and
substantial.'"15
Thus the question of the validity of declaratory judgment procedure under state legislation was squarely presented and definitely
construed and finally decided in favor of such procedure. Prior
to this decision some doubt had been expressed by the federal
courts obiter dicta as to whether a court in rendering a declaratory
judgment was exercising a judicial function, upon the erroneous
theory that such a judgment was analogous to an advisory opinion.
The Tennessee case was decided when the federal act was being
considered by Congress and was doubtless a factor in influencing
its action in passing the legislation putting the act into effect.
The federal act came before the Supreme Court in Aetna Life
Titsurance Company v. Haworth.3 6 In this case the jurisdiction of
the district court in Tennessee was challenged upon the ground that
the suit did not set forth a controversy within the meaning of the
federal constitution," and hence did not come within the legitimate
scope of the federal declaratory judgment statute. The facts were
as follows: Plaintiff life insurance company had issued policies of
35 Id. at 264, 53 S. Ct. at 348, 77 L. Ed.at 736.
so 300 U. S. 227, 57 S. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617 (1937).
37 U. S. CONST. Art. II-, § 2.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1938

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1938], Art. 5
46

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE

insurance to the defendant providing for disability payments,
waiver of premiums and other benefits, in the event of total and
permanent disability of the insured who had discontinued payment of premiums and claimed payments and benefits by reason
of disability existing at the time when payment of premiums was
discontinued. The insurer denied that any disability existed when
the premiums were discontinued and contended that the policies
had lapsed for nonpayment of premiums. The suit was instituted
to have the policies declared null and void by reason of lapse for
nonpayment of premiums and for such further relief as the
exigencies of the case might require. The court held:
First, "The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation
to 'cases of actual controversy' manifestly has regard to the
constitutional provision and is operative only in respect to
controversies which are such in' the constitutional sense. The
word 'actual' is one of emphasis rather than definition. Thus
the operation
of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural
38
only."
Second, " . . . . In providing remedies and defining procedure in
relation to cases and controversies in the constitutional sense
the Congress is acting within its delegated power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Congress is authorized
to establish." 9
Third, "A 'controversy' in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial determination ....
A justiciable controversy
is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or
moot.... The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests ....
It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical statement of facts." 40
Fourth, "Where there is such a concrete case admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the
parties in an adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the
judicial function may be appropriately exercised although the
adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require the
award of process or the payment of damages. . . . And as it
is not essential to the exercise of the judicial power that an
38 300 U. S. 227, 239-240, 57 S. Ct. 461, 463, 81 L. Ed. 617, 621 (1937).
39 Id. at 240, 57 S. Ct. at 463, 81 L. Ed. at 621.
40

Id. at 240-241, 57 S. Ct. at 464, 81 L. Ed. at 621.
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injunction be sought, allegations that irreparable injury is
threatened are not required." 41
The court, reversing a decree of the circuit court of appeals
affirming a decree of the district court dismissing the complaint,
found that there was a dispute between parties in an adversary
proceeding relating to legal rights and obligations arising from
the contracts of insurance and that the dispute was definite and
concrete, not hypothetical or abstract; that the claim of the insured was to a present specific right and that the insurer made an
equally definite claim that the alleged basic fact of total and permanent disability 'did not exist; that such a dispute was manifestly
susceptible of judicial determination; that the fact that the dispute
turned upon questions of fact did not withdraw it from judicial
cognizance; that the legal consequence flowed from the facts; that
it was the province of the court to ascertain and find the facts in
order to determine the legal consequences; that such was everyday practice.
ADAPTABIaTY

Historically, modern declaratory judgment procedure appears
to have originated in equity practice although it was in time
adapted to legal actions also where nothing more than a declaration
of rights was sought, although the procedure has been described as
being neither distinctly in law nor in equity, but sui generis.4 Regardless of the exact technical nature of the proceeding, the fact
remains that it is employed both in those states where the distinction between law and equity has been abolished and in those states
where the distinction is still preserved as in New Jersey, where
separate courts administer the two systems, and as in Virginia
where the distinction is observed much the same as in our own
state. This is true also of the English practice where the distinction is still maintained, although there was in the beginning some
resistance to the introduction of declaratory judgments into law
actions. Although applicable to both fields, a declaration is sought
in law with comparative rarity and it is principally in equity that
it is usually employed. In fact, it appears that in England a majority of the equity cases coming before the courts for decision are
proceedings for a declaratory judgment."
41

Id. at 241, 57 S. Ot. at 464, 81 L. Ed. at 622.

42 BORcHARD, DECLARATOaY JUDGMFENTs 634.
43 Id. at 632.
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To date all declaratory judgments in this country are authorized either under the federal act or the acts of the various states,
and no such judgment appears to have been authorized by rule of
court alone, independent of statute, although in many states the
act is supplemented by court rules. It is interesting to note, however, that the suggestion was made, before the enactment of the
federal statute and some years before the federal rule maling
statute of 1934, that the Supreme Court of the United States could
probably have authorized declarations under its equity rule malting
power, 4 4 and unquestionably under the new federal rules for district courts a declaration could have been authorized had the necessity existed.
In West Virginia we have at hand ready for use the rule
making power of our supreme court under the Act of 1934, which
gives to that court power to make and promulgate "general rules
and regulations governing pleading, practice and procedure in
such court and all other courts of record in this state" and provides, further, that "all statutes relating to pleading, practice and
procedure shall have force and effect only as rules of court and
shall remain in effect unless and until modified, suspended or annulled" by such rules.4" The state statute is substantially similar
to the federal act which gives the United States Supreme Court
power to prescribe, for district courts and courts of the District
of Columbia, "the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions,
The
and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law."
rule
maldng
under
its
United States Supreme Court has seen fit,
power, to put into effect an entire new system of practice and procedure for the federal courts and no reason is perceived why the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia should hesitate to
put declaratory judgment procedure into effect in this state by rule
of that court if, after consideration, it appears that such an addition to our procedure is desired by the bar of the state and will
add another useful implement to the legal armory of the practitioner - an implement to be used as a weapon where an affirmative declaration is sought and as a shield where a negative declaration is desired. Certainly such rules in this state would represent
far less of a departure from present practice than will be effected
in federal practice when the new federal rules go into effect in less
than one month. The example of the English Supreme Court of
SEx. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
45 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 5, art. 1, § 4.
44
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Judicature, in establishing procedure for declarations by order
XXV, rule 5, and other orders, and the subsequent success of the
procedure introduced thereby, should not be forgotten. Moreover,
the addition of the declaratory judgment to our procedural remedies would in reality represent only an enlargement of the present
limited field in which it is now employed, although not eo nomine,
as, for example, in suits to quiet title and remove clouds on title,
proceedings by fiduciaries to determine their powers and duties or
suits to determine the validity of a marriage.
Enough has been said to show, that, as its name indicates,
declaratory judgment procedure does not affect any substantive
rights and therefore it is scarcely conceivable that any rule of
court adopting the procedure could be attacked on constitutional
grounds. Except as to the amount involved, the only practical
limitation upon the general jurisdiction of our courts is to cases
involving a controversy, and it is apparent from the cases which
have been discussed that the nature of the declaration sought does
not remove the controversial element which would exist if some
other form of relief were sought.
Because of the basic similarity of procedure between Virginia
and West Virginia it may be recalled that the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia sustained the Virginia declaratory judgment
act in the Patterson case. 46 In this case the court defined the term
"actual controversy" as used in the Virginia act, which it held
constitutional because the act involved only cases of actual controversy. The section of the Virginia act involved reads as follows:
"In cases of actual controversy, courts of record within
the scope of their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
make binding adjudications of right, whether or not consequential relief is, or at the time could be, claimed and no action
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
judgment or order merely declaratory of right is prayed for.
Controversies involving the interpretation of deeds, wills, other
instruments of writing, statutes, municipal ordinances, and
other governmental regulations, may be so determined, and
of actual
this enumeration does not exclude other instances
'47
antagonistic assertion and denial of right.'
46 144 Va. 113, 131 S. E. 217 (1926).
47 VA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1936) § 6140a.
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In this case the court said:
"We find nothing in the statute which contravenes any of
the provisions of the State or Federal Constitutions. Its effect
is to increase the usefulness of the courts and remove doubt
and uncertainty as to the final result of legal controversies, by
empowering the courts to enter declaratory judgments and de'48
crees touching the rights of the parties in such cases."
UsEULNEsS
The various classes of cases in which a declaratory judgment
is not only useful but superior to the remedies now afforded under
the limitations of our procedural law are almost as broad as the
field of litigation itself. The functions of the judgment as
enumerated by Professor Borchard and the cases which have been
discussed illustrate this fact so well that further detailed discussion is scarcely required. It is unlikely that there is any one
of my listeners who does not have some case pending in court today, or who has not had some case in the past, in which the application of declaratory judgment procedure would not have presented a better method of solving the problem with which he was confronted when the litigation was initiated and with which procedure
available be would have been in a better and more secure position
to advise his client as to the method to be pursued in determining
his rights under the facts involved. With such procedure available a lawyer would not be obliged, as is so often the case now, to
say to his client, "Under the facts as you state them, the law appears to be thus and I think you may safely proceed on that basis,
but if the court should hold otherwise, then you are liable to
answer in damages." Instead the lawyer would say, "Under the
facts as you state them, the law appears to be thus but before proceeding as you propose, we will bring a suit for a declaration of
your rights and if I am correct in my opinion you may then proceed, but if it turns out that I am wrong, or if the court happens
to decide the case wrong, as courts sometimes do, then you may
not proceed and you will not be liable for any damages, not having
done anything which you did not have a legal right to do." The
thought may occur that, after all, a declaratory judgment will not
be often sought even if available. To a certain extent this might
be true at first but if experience elsewhere is a good criterion, it
48 144 Va. 113, 119, 131 S. E. 217, 219 (1926).
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is reasonable to assume that such judgments will be sought with
increasing frequency as lawyers become familiar with their advantages. Conceding, though, that judgments will not be sought with
any degree of comparative frequency, this fact is no argument
against them. We have today proceedings which are not often
employed such as quo warranto but no one would advocate that
they be eliminated from our law for that reason.
Much has been written about the social aspects of declaratory
judgment procedure and how it serves to reduce the economic
waste and the undesirable results, from a social standpoint, of the
ordinary type of litigation. This is undoubtedly true and while
we already hear too much today about the social aspects of legislation and the administration of laws (and those aspects have been
much overemphasized), we cannot close our eyes to the fact that
our procedure is susceptible of improvement. It is our duty as
lawyers to effect such improvement as can be made consistent with
sound principles of procedure. Anything which serves to make the
lawyer more useful to his client, which serves to lessen the hazards
of litigation, which serves to determine legal rights, status and
relations as soon as possible after the questions involving them
arise, which serves to lessen the ultimate cost and waste of litigation, which serves to lessen the bitterness and hatred so often
engendered by litigation, is deserving of our serious consideration
and action in respect thereto when the success of such procedure
has been demonstrated. In addition to the advantages enumerated,
Professor Sunderland suggested a further advantage, when he
said:
"But there is a second result which this procedure accomplishes in cases where coercive relief might be had, and that is
a psychological one. Every case may by this means become, in
appearance at least, a friendly suit. . . . When you ask for a
declaration of right only, you treat him [the defendant] as a
gentleman. "49
Of course the objection might be made that very often the
defendant is no gentleman and should not be treated as such, at
least in many cases the plaintiff is convinced that such is the fact
and no doubt the defendant is equally convinced that the same is
true of the plaintiff.
49 Sunderland, The Deciaratory Judgment (1918) 16 MicH. L. REv. 69, 76.
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The uniform act, the several state acts and the federal act
all contain material to draw from in framing any procedure desired for, and adaptable to, our system. To close, I can do no better than to quote an often repeated remark wherein, referring to
declaratory judgment procedure it was said: "You have the same
court, the same jurisdiction, the same procedure, the same parties
and the same question. Under the present law you take a step in
the dark and then turn on the light, to see if you have stepped into
a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you turn on the light
and then take the step ",5 to which might be added - "if you
want to take the step after having turned on the light."
5
0oRepresentative Ralph Gilbert in the House of Representatives, Jan. 25,
1928.
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